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How Exporting Firms Respond to Technical Barriers to Trade? 
 
Abstract: This paper investigates how Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) affect firm export 
performance. The implementation of the “Children-Resistance” act (CR act) in the EU offers an 
ideal quasi-natural experiment to identify the causal effect of TBTs on firm performance. Using 
data on Chinese firms that export cigarette lighters between 2004 and 2008, empirical results show 
that firms that export to the EU not only adjust their product quality to meet the requirements in 
the CR act, but also upgrade their product quality in other dimensions. However, both the export 
value and export volume to the EU decline. At the same time, less productive exporters are forced 
to exit from the EU market. In addition, while the effect of the CR act on export quality is 
significant only in the implementation year, its impact on firm-level export scale last longer even 
after its implementation, which is referred to as a dynamic impact. Lastly, Heterogeneous effect of 
TBT is also documented. 
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1.  Introduction 
Despite World Trade Organization (WTO) objective to reduce and sustain lower applied 
tariffs in the past decades, non-tariff trade barriers (NTB) have remained persistent and have even 
been increasingly implemented by the governments of WTO members (Prusa, 2011; Zanardi, 2006; 
Bown, 2011). Non-tariff barriers are permissible under WTO rules and encompass a wide range of 
measures, in which technical-barriers to trade (TBT) account for a nontrivial share. During 
2000-2014, a total of 19,141 NTB cases are reported among WTO members, and, of that 10,046 
TBT account for 52.5% of all NTB cases. The pervasiveness of TBT measures has spurred 
researchers to study their effect on firm export behaviors. 
Although the effects of TBT measures on protected domestic firms and industries has 
received substantial attentions, much less is known about their impact on affected foreign 
exporters.
1
 It is of policy and research importance to understand how affected foreign exporters 
respond to TBT measures as their strategic responses (in price, quality, and exports) have 
significant influence on the market competition structure and welfare in both domestic and foreign 
countries. Further, examining firm-level heterogeneous response when facing a shock generated 
by TBT complements the firm heterogeneity literature. In the existing literature, the primary focus 
is how TBTs affect firms’ export market entry and exit decisions, but very few papers explore how 
firm-level export price, quantity, and quality responses are related. In this work, we attempt to 
investigate the influence of TBTs on firm-level export quality, quantity, and entry/exit decisions. 
China offers an ideal setting to study the impact of TBTs on firm-level export behaviors for 
three reasons. First, China is one of the world’s largest recipients of NTB measures (Lu, et al. 
2013). In 2012, China was involved in 77 cases of trade disputes initiated by 21 countries, and the 
amount of money involved accounted for more than 28 billion USD. Trade frictions between 
China and other countries lead to frequent adoptions of TBTs in foreign countries, which aim to 
restrict exports from China. Second, a considerable number of Chinese exporters have been 
influenced by TBTs in different forms. In 2013, among 3,152 randomly surveyed export firms 
from 31 Chinese provinces, 38% reported that they were subject to or influenced by TBT 
measures. In particular, chemical and allied, textile and cloth, vegetable products, 
machinery/electric, and foodstuffs industries are most likely to be subject to TBTs (AQSIQ, 2013). 
Third, exporters from China manifest substantial differentiation even in the same industry. For 
instance, in electronic heater industry, the largest exporters export more than 20,000 times of the 
smallest exporters in 2006. This feature enables us to study the heterogeneous impact of TBTs on 
different firms.  
We mainly rely on the Children-Resistance (CR) Act implemented by EU in 2007 as an 
quasi-experiment to identify how Chinese exporters react to TBTs. According to CR Act in 2007, 
                                                             
1
 A few papers investigate how antidumping policy affect foreign exporters’ pricing response (Blonigen and Park, 
2004), export-destination choice (Bown and Crowley, 2006, 2007), and FDI strategies. (Blonigen, 2002). 
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all cigarette lighters are required to be child-resistant in order to reduce the injuries Children who 
end up with playing with them. This act forces all imported cigarette lighters to comply with the 
relevant specifications of the European standard. It provides a quasi-natural experiment to study 
the impact of TBTs on the performance of lighter exporters, especially from China.
2
 
To identify the impact of the CR act on firm export performance, we employ a 
difference-in-difference (DID) approach at both the firm-destination (for export quality and 
quantity) level and firm (for import quality) level. Using firm-level transaction data of Chinese 
cigarette lighter exporters during 2004-2008,
3
we classify cigarette lighter exporters into treatment 
or control group according to their export destination. Specifically, the treatment group contains 
firms that export cigarette lighter to the EU, and the control group contains firms that export to 
non-EU regions. The DID results indicate that after the implementation of the CR act, the quality 
of cigarette lighters exported (by Chinese firms) to the EU has significantly increased relative to 
the exports in non-EU markets.
4
 The result is valid for all three measures of quality. The first 
quality measure is unit price; the second quality measure is estimated by Khandelwal et al. (2013); 
the third one is new to this paper. Specifically, we track the imported materials of the treated firms 
and find that firms that export cigarette lighters to the EU not only adjust their export quality to 
meet requirements of the CR act, but also upgrade quality in other dimensions:
5
e.g. durability 
(upgrading from plastic shell to a galvanizing metal shell), serviceability (upgrading from not 
using a lighter filter to using one), features
6
 (upgrading from roller lighter to an electronic lighter). 
This finding is in line with the literature which indicates substantial fixed costs in R&D activities 
(e.g. Aw, et al., 2011; Dai and Yu, 2013; Ludema and Yu, 2016), and once firms pay the large 
R&D costs, they will upgrade their quality in multiple dimensions.  
In addition, results show that cigarette lighter firms (from China) shrink their exports, in both 
volume and value, to the EU in 2007, even though their export quality increases. The cigarette 
lighter exports from China to the EU continue to fall in 2008, which may reflect destination 
diversification or trade division. We also find that the impact of the CR act varies for different 
firms. In particular, relative to single-product firms, exports to the EU fall more for multi-product 
firms, which might be driven by the cannibalization effect
7
. At the meanwhile, comparing with 
                                                             
2Cigarette lighters from China are characterized by low prices but poor security conditions. As such, the CR act 
has been treated as targeting Chinese cigarette lighter exporters. Many Chinese Media report the severe situation 
faced by lighter producers after the CR Act of 2006, see for example: 
http://biz.zjol.com.cn/05biz/system/2006/03/01/006495532.shtml  
3We also conduct robustness checks by using data from 2000-2008. 
4The results are robust to different measures of product quality. 
5
David A. Garvin (1987) defines eight dimensions of product quality management, which contain performance, 
feature, reliability, conformance, durability, serviceability, aesthetics, and perceived quality. The upgrading from 
plastic shell to galvanized metal share is an upgrade in the "durability dimension"; the use of a filter is an upgrade 
in the "serviceability dimension"; and upgrading from roller lighter to electric lighter is an upgrade in the "feature 
dimension". 
6
 Features are additional characteristics that enhance the appeal of the product or service to the user. 
7
 Multi-product firms can flexibly adjust their export skewness in response to different degree of market 
competiveness (see Eckl and Neary, 2010), which is called cannibalization effect. The cannibalization effect leads 
different responses in export quantities between multi-product and single-product firms.   
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foreign-owned firms, domestic private firms improve their products quality more, but decrease 
their exports more. Last, the implementation of the CR act drives out less productive and affected 
firms from the EU market, but more productive exporters survive. This implies that the CR act 
brings temporary benefits to EU producers who expand their market share. In the long run, 
however, the CR act may put EU producer in a disadvantage position when competing with 
Chinese exporters, who conduct quality upgrading and become more competitive. 
Our work contributes to the literature on four dimensions. First, most TBT related research is 
at the country or product level, and the firm-level analysis has rarely been studied. For instance, 
Chenvassus-Lozza et al. (2005) study the role of European import standards (NTBs) for new 
member states trade flows in the food sector. Czubala et al. (2009) and Portugal-Perez et al. (2009) 
investigate the impact of harmonized standards adopted by the EU on textile and electric exports 
from African countries. Bao and Qiu (2012) evaluate the impact of TBT notifications on the 
intensive and extensive trade flows at the country-level. Firm-level analysis may better reveal the 
micro-channels through which TBTs affect the aggregate trade flows, e.g. resource reallocation, 
quality upgrading, etc. 
Second, we introduce a novel path to investigate the influence of TBTs on firm-level export 
quality to avoid quality estimation bias. That is, we examine how TBT notifications affect the 
firm-level imported intermediates. Specifically, we compare the intermediates that firms import 
before and after the CR act, and determine the quality changes in intermediate inputs, e.g. 
cigarette lighters made by galvanizing metal shell are better than those made by plastic shell. 
Since the quality of intermediate inputs is closely related to the quality of final products (e.g. 
Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Hallak and Sividasan, 2013;Rodrigue and Tan, 2016; Fan, et al., 
2015), we can uncover the impact of the CR act on the firm-level export quality through observing 
its impact on the firm-level import quality. Further, examining the firm-level imported materials 
allows us to assess the influence of the CR act on the “extensive margin” of quality upgrading:
8
 
besides upgrading the safety standard, export firms may also upgrade their product quality along 
other dimensions in response to the CR act.  
Third, although a few papers document the impact of technical regulations on firm-level 
export performance, they looked at a small set of questions because of data limitations. Maskus et 
al. (2005) study the influence of technical regulations on 619 firms from 17 developing countries, 
and find a positive correlation of the restrictiveness of the TBTs and firm-level variable/fixed 
production cost, which has pronounced influence on firms’ exports. Using the same data, Chen et 
al. (2008) document that TBTs reduce firms’ export propensity and number of export destinations. 
Therefore, there are some important questions which remain unresolved; namely how do firms 
upgrade their product quality to comply with the TBT standards? What types of firms will be most 
                                                             
8
 Product quality can be decomposed into different dimensions. The quality of cigarette lighters, for instance, is 
determined by whether it has a safety device; whether it uses galvanized metal shell or plastic shell; with or 
without a filter; or if it is an electronic or roller lighter.   
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influenced? Our paper is able to fill this gap in the literature by answering these questions.  
Fourth, the literature focuses on the static effect of TBTs on firm performance. A vast number 
of papers investigate the effect of TBTs through comparing affected firms export performance 
before and after the technical barriers (Fischer and Serra, 2000; Baldwin, 2001; Ganslandt and 
Markusen, 2001), and therefore they cannot reveal the dynamic effect of TBTs. A natural question 
is whether firms further upgrade their product quality or adjust their exports to the protected 
destinations after the TBTs are applied? We try to track the evolution of quality and exports in the 
years after the TBT implementation. This allows us to better understand the dynamic impact of 
TBTs on firms’ export behavior. 
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows: section 2 introduces the background of CR act, 
and its impact on Chinese cigarette lighter exporters. Section 3 describes the data and estimate 
strategy. Section 4 reports the results. The robustness checks are reported in section 5, and we 
conclude in section 6. 
2.  The Background of the CR act and Hypothesizes 
2.1 The background of the CR act 
Cigarette lighter exports account for a nontrivial share in global trade. In 2014, the total 
exports of cigarette lighters are up to $700 million. Europe was originally the center for cigarette 
lighter production, and later the production center moved to Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. From 
1980's onwards, Chinese cigarette lighter begin to lead world trade, especially lighters from 
Wenzhou city. The rapid growth of Chinese cigarette lighters impede the development of the 
cigarette lighter industry in other countries. As such, U.S. passed the CR act to refrain the cigarette 
lighter imports from China in 1994 to protect its own domestic cigarette lighter production. Since 
then, most Chinese firms switched exporting cigarette lighters from the U.S. to the EU. The rapid 
import growth of cigarette lighters from China led EU countries to consider technical barriers to 
prevent the dramatic market share expansion of China-made cigarette lighters.  
In 2001, the EU started to discuss the details of the EU version of CR act. Initially, the EU 
version of the CR act was a simple copy of the American standards. The decision requires the 
government to ensure that the common cigarette lighters placed on the EU market are 
child-resistant: at least 85% children in the strike test cannot successfully strike the lighters. It also 
forbids lighters that resemble objects which children find attractive (also called “novelty lighters”). 
After negotiating with the commerce department and trade association of China, the EU postponed 
the implementation date of the CR act from 2004 to 2007, and 2006-2007 was decided as the 
transition period. The EU version of the CR act also required the working life of cigarette lighters 
to be no fewer than 5 years; otherwise they have to be equipped with a safety device.  
Exports of Chinese cigarette lighters’ are heavily influenced by the CR act. First, cigarette 
lighters produced in other countries are often produced with a safety device. As such, they directly 
comply with the standards outlined in the CR act. In contrast, Chinese cigarette lighters are often 
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characterized by their inexpensive price and their lack of safety devices. Second, the simple 
features of Chinese cigarette lighters makes their working life far fewer than 5 years. Without 
meeting the technical barriers, Chinese lighter exporters have to exit from the EU market. 
2.2 The impact of the CR act on firm-level export behavior 
The standards listed in CR act force Chinese lighter exporters to meet the technical barriers in 
order to continue exporting to the EU. Therefore, the continuing exporters have to improve their 
product quality, such as adding safety devices or changing the packaging to comply with the CR 
act. We have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The CR act encourages Chinese lighter exporters to innovate, and 
improve their export quality to the EU. 
In order to meet the technical barriers, firms have to invest substantially in R&D. This 
investment includes large sunk start-up costs, which on the one hand, increases firm-level fixed 
cost. On the other hand, after the quality improvement, the production of higher quality lighters 
increases firm-level variable costs. For instance, Maskus et al. (2005) demonstrate that the TBTs 
will increase the variable production costs by 0.06-0.13 percent, and increase the fixed costs by 5 
percent in the affected countries. As the cost increases, especially the increase in the variable cost 
will decrease firm-level exports in the EU.
9
 We have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: the CR act decreases the affected firms’ exports to the EU. 
The literature indicates that the increase in fixed costs decrease firm-level export propensity 
(Dixit, 1989a, 1989b; Krugman, 1989). Aw, et al. (2011) document that among incumbent 
exporters, only larger ones can afford the fixed R&D costs. Melitz (2003) shows that larger 
exporters are often more productive. Taking all of these together, we predict that the CR act will 
drive those small and less productive firms out of the EU market, as they cannot afford the R&D 
investment to comply with the standards of the CR act. We have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: the CR act drive less productive firms out of the EU market. 
In the following sections, we attempt to test these three hypothesizes to better understand the 
impact of the CR act on firm-level export behavior. Since the CR act gives one year transition 
period for Chinese lighter exporters, we try to separately identify the impact of the CR act on 
firm-level export behaviors during the transition and implementation period. The data and 
estimation strategies will be introduced in the subsequent section. 
3.  Date and Estimation 
3.1. Data 
We use the firm-level transaction data from Chinese Custom Trade Statistics (CCTS) over the 
                                                             
9 We notice that although the variable costs increase for continuing exporters after the implementation of the CR 
act, product quality also increases. It is not necessary for that Chinese cigarette lighter exporters will experience a 
reduction in exports to the EU. However, note that Chinese exporters initially export low quality lighters to the EU 
market, while cigarette lighters the EU imports from other countries are characterized by high quality. As such, 
Chinese exporters have to compete with exporters from other countries in the high quality lighter market, which is 
not their comparative advantage. 
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2004-2008 period. The CCTS data in 2004-2006 record firm-level transaction information at a 
monthly level, and during 2007-2008, the information is reported at the annual level. We first 
aggregate the observations from the 2004-2006 period into an annual series by firm, product, and 
destination. After combining the two pieces of export information, we keep only observations 
from firms that export cigarette lighters, which include HS codes “96131000” (Pocket Lighters, 
Gas Fueled, Non-refillable) and “96139000” (Parts of Cigarette Lighters & Other Lighters). The 
dataset contains information of firm-level export quantity, value, destination, trade regime, etc. In 
this sample, every year there are, on average, 369 Chinese firms that export cigarette lighters. 
Each firm exports, on average, to 21 countries. Among all cigarette lighter exporters, 22.6% of 
them export to EU and about 80% of them export to at least two destinations.  
Table 1 straightforwardly describes key patterns with which we are concerned. First, the 
export share in value to the EU relative to all other countries declines after the CR act, from 44.21% 
to 29.47%, and export share in volume to the EU relative all other countries declines from 45.26% 
(before the CR act) to 33.68% (after the CR act). Second, while the average export price in other 
countries increases 2.69 times after the CR act, the price in EU increases 4.61 times. This evidence 
indicates differential path of Chinese exporters in EU and non-EU countries. However, it is 
unclear whether this difference is caused by the implementation of the CR act or just represents 
the differential trends over time of firms exporting to EU and non-EU countries. In order to 
evaluate the impact of the CR act on Chinese cigarette lighter exporters, we adopt a 
difference-in-difference (DID) strategy. 
[Table 1 is to be here] 
3.2. Estimation strategy 
The EU carried out the CR act in three important stages: the determination (in 2006), the 
transition period (2006-2007), and the implementation (in 2007). To identify the possible effects 
of the CR acts on Chinese exporters and test hypotheses, we employ a DID estimation strategy at 
the firm-product level. Specifically, the identification relies on two sources of variation: time 
variation (before and after a critical date during the CR act process), and cross-sectional variation 
(affected products/firms and unaffected products/firms).   
In our baseline regression, we classify firms that export cigarette lighters to the EU into the 
treatment group, and firms that export cigarette lighters to the non-EU countries as the control 
group. It must be pointed out that if a firm exports to both the EU and non-EU countries, it 
belongs to both the treated group and control group. One reason we proceed in this way is because 
firms could differentiate their product quality and price across export countries (Manova and 
Zhang, 2012). Therefore, even for the same firm, the implementation of the CR act in the EU can 
differently affect the firm’s export behavior in the EU and non-EU countries, and this difference 
identifies the treatment effect. However, if firms that export to both the EU and non-EU countries 
upgrade their export quality simultaneously, the treatment effect will be underestimated. To 
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address this concern, we conduct a robustness check in section 5 to classify firms into control 
group if they export cigarette lighters to non-EU countries only.
10
 The baseline regression is as 
follows: 
   𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗 + 𝜆𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡   (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents the firm-level outcome variables including quality, total export value and 
volume for firm i to destinations j in year t. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗 is a dummy variable which takes value 1 if 
firm i belongs to the treatment group, 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 contains year, destination, and firm fixed 
effects.
11
 In addition, after the exchange rate reform in China in 2005, the exchange rate for the 
RMB was relatively volatile, which might affect the quality of exported products. Therefore, we 
also control for the exchange rate between China and destination countries in our estimation. 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 and 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 are dummies denoting the start of the transition and 
implementation date of the CR act respectively, which are defined as follows: 
 
 
 
           
 
The coefficients, α1 and α2, capture the average difference between the treatment and 
control group before and after the transition and implementation period, respectively. 
While it can be easily get the export value and export volume from the dataset, export quality 
is not readily available. As such, we have three ways to measure the export quality. First, in the 
baseline regression, we follow Schott (2004), Hummels and Skiba (2004)；Hallak (2006), and 
Manova and Zhang (2012), and use the unit price of cigarette lighters, 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡, to proxy export 
quality in different countries. The unit price is constructed by using the aggregate export value 
divided by aggregate export volume: 𝑝𝑖𝑗𝑡 =
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑡
. Second, as a robustness check, we also 
construct the quality measure following Khandelwal et al. (2013). Lastly, we also check firm-level 
quality upgrading evidence by tracking firms' imported materials. Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), 
Hallak and Sividasan (2013), Rodrigue and Tan(2016), Fan, et al.(2015) confirm the quality 
connection between intermediate inputs and final products.  
In our last approach, instead of estimating the quality of imported intermediate goods, we 
examine how the probability of importing better intermediates increases the probability that firms 
export to the EU after the CR act. Specifically, we deem lighters with filters, galvanizing metal 
                                                             
10 i.e. we exclude firms that simultaneously export to the EU and non-EU market from control group.  
11 Since we control for year fixed effects, the 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 and 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 dummies will be dropped, 
and hence, we do not add them in the benchmark regression. For the similar reasons, after we control for firm fixed 
effects, the dummy 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗 will be automatically dropped. As such, we do not include 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗 in regression (1) 
neither. 
Implementationjt= 
1, when t≥ 2007 
0, otherwise 
Transitionjt= 
1, when t∈[2006,2007) 
0, otherwise 
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shells, and electric parts (other than flints) as high quality relative to lighters without filters, using 
plastic shells and flints.
12
 Therefore, if the probability of importing filters, or galvanizing metal 
shells, or electric parts increases more for firms which export lighters to the EU, we can say that 
the CR act leads firms to upgrade export quality. Since it is unclear how to allocate firm-level 
intermediates across products which are exported to different countries, we can only conduct a 
DID test at firm-level rather than at firm-destination level in regression (1). We note that although 
we have only included firms which import intermediate inputs in this regression, the large 
majority of firms in our sample do so.
13
 The specification we run is as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡    (2) 
where, 𝑌𝑖𝑡  represents a dummy variables at firm-level. If firm i imports higher quality 
intermediates, 𝑌𝑖𝑡  takes value 1, and 0 otherwise. The definition of Transition and 
Implementation is the same as above. In this estimation, we classify firms that continuously export 
to the EU (before and after the CR act) into the treatment group, and firms that do not export to 
the EU or firms that stop exporting to the EU after 2007 into control group. We aim to examine 
whether firms that continue to export to EU after 2007 upgrade their importing relative to other 
firms.
14
  η
it
= η
i
+ η
t
 captures the firm and year fixed effects. 
In order to investigate the dynamic impact of the CR act on firm-level export behavior, we 
add an interaction term between Implementationjt × Groupj and year 2008 according to Han et 
al. (2012) as follows: 
             𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑡           (3) 
                          𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑗𝑡 ×  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2008 + 𝜂𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                                         
where year2008 is a dummy variable which takes value 1when year=2008, 0 otherwise. The 
coefficient 𝛽2 captures the effect of the implementation of CR act in 2008. Comparing the 
magnitude of 𝛽1and 𝛽2, we can disentangle the dynamic impact of the CR act on firm-level 
export behavior.  
To test hypothesis 3, we do not use the DID method. Instead, following Lu et al. (2013), we 
estimate the following regression: 
                         𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝜙0 + 𝜙1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                 (4) 
                                                             
12 Lighter filters can improve the gas combustion efficiency; galvanizing metal shells are rust-proof and provide 
thermal insulation; and electric lighters are safer and cleaner than roller lighters. 
13More than 95% of cigarette lighter exporters are simultaneous intermediate importers. As such, in this approach, 
we are still focus on the majority of the cigarette lighter exporters (see Rodrigue and Tan, 2016 for a similar 
argument). 
14The advantage of this method is to avoid estimating the elasticity of substitution across different export varieties, 
which may cause estimation bias when estimate export quality. For instance, Khandelwal et al. (2013) estimate 
product quality by imposing an invariant elasticity of substitution, 𝜎. Note that 𝜎 also captures firm-level markup, 
which would be variant when the firm-level product quality changes.  
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where 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if firm i exits from the EU market after the 
implementation of the CR act, and 0 otherwise. Productivityi is firm i’s productivity in 2007, the 
implementation year of the CR act. Following Lu et al. (2007), we use the log total firm-level 
exports to proxy firm-level productivity.  
4.  Empirical Results 
    4.1 Identifying assumption and checks 
    The validity of our DID estimation hinges on one key assumption: the treatment group would 
have the same trend as the control group before the CR act. To check this identifying assumption, 
we first show that treatment and control groups follow the same trends in export quality, export 
value and export volume until the CR act. Following Han et al.(2012) , we augment regression (1) 
by replacing the CR act transition and implementation dummies with a vector of year dummies t , 
indicating the year from 2005 to 2008 (2004 is the reference year). We plot the estimated 
coefficients of the interaction j tgroup  and their 95% confidence intervals in Figure 1a-1c for 
exported quality, export value and export volume in order. Figure 1a-1c shows that prior to the 
implementation of the CR act, export quality, export value and export volume exhibits similar 
evolution patterns for treated and control groups. However, after the implementation of the CR act, 
the trend for export quality, export value and export volume is significantly varies across treatment 
and control groups. Therefore, DID approach is applicable in this study.    
[Figure 1a is to be here] 
[Figure 1b is to be here] 
[Figure 1c is to be here] 
    4.2 The impact of the CR act on quality 
This section mainly discusses the impact of the CR act on firm-level export quality. We report 
the results of benchmark regression in Table 2. 
[Table 2 is to be here] 
Columns 1-4 of Table 2 report the estimation results from equation (1). In columns 1 and 2, 
we use firm-level export unit value to proxy product quality. Column 1 contains firm and country 
fixed effects, while column 2 contains firm, country and year fixed effects. The results indicate 
that the coefficient of 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝  is statistically insignificant. In contrast, the 
coefficient of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 is positive and statistically positive. In column 3 and 
column 4, we construct the quality measure following Khandelwal et al. (2013),
15
 and use the 
                                                             
15
Khandelwal et al. (2013) show the relationship among firm-level export volume, product price and quality. 
According to the relationship, we can have a regression equation 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑦𝑖ℎ𝑐𝑡) + 𝜇 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑐𝑡) = 𝜑ℎ + 𝜑𝑐𝑡 + 𝜏𝑖ℎ𝑐𝑡, 
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constructed quality as the dependent variable to estimate equation (1) again. The coefficient of 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝  is still statistically insignificant, while the coefficient of 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 is still positive and statistically significant. These results simply that 
the firm-level export quality does not significantly improve in the EU during the transition period 
of the CR act (2006). Instead, it increases when the CR act is implemented (2007). There are 
several reasons which explain the empirical results. First, it takes time to improve the product 
quality. Improving product quality usually requires higher technology. When such technology is 
unavailable, firms have to invest in R&D before they can upgrade their product quality, which 
requires time. Second, during the transition period, low quality cigarette lighters still can be 
exported to the EU. Therefore, the exporters do not need to improve their product quality in EU 
during the transition period. 
Column 5 and 6 report the results for equation (3). In these two columns we drop the 
interaction, 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝, and track the dynamic impact of the CR act on the firm-level 
export quality. Not surprisingly, we find that the CR act increases the firm-level product quality 
that exports to the EU in the implemented year (2007). In addition, the statistically insignificant 
coefficient of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2008suggests that Chinese exporters do not 
continuously increase their quality once their export lighters reach the standards in the CR act.  
To alleviate the concern that the estimated coefficient on export quality is biased, we examine 
whether firms that export lighters to the EU market tend to import higher quality materials after 
the CR act, since higher quality of inputs are typically related to higher quality of final products 
(e.g. Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012; Hallak and Sividasan, 2013; Rodrigue and Tan, 2016; Fan, et 
al., 2015). Here, we check the probability that a firm imports intermediate inputs which could 
produce higher quality of final products instead of estimating the quality of imported product. In 
particular, we treat cigarette lighter producers using filters, galvanizing metal shell and electronic 
parts as high quality relative to producers using no filter, plastic shells and flints. For visual 
comparison purpose, we show the difference between plastic shell lighters and galvanizing metal 
shell lighters in Figure 2a, and the difference between roller lighter and electronic lighters in 
Figure 2b, respectively. 
[Figure 2a is to be here] 
[Figure 2b is to be here] 
The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm imports a filter, or galvanizing mental shell, or 
electronic parts, and is 0 otherwise. Since the dependent variable is a dummy variable, we estimate 
equation (2) using linear and nonlinear DID, respectively. The results are reported in Table 3.  
                                                                                                                                                                              
where yihct is the total export volume of product h by firm i to country c in year t, and pipct is the corresponding 
price. μis the substitution elasticity across products, and following literature we set it to be 5. 𝜑ℎand𝜑𝑐𝑡 are 
product, and country-year fixed effect. The quality measure has the form: ?̃?𝑖ℎ𝑐𝑡 = 𝜏/(𝜇 − 1). 
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                        [Table 3 is to be here] 
Column 1 and 2 report imported filter response to the CR act. The results indicate that firms 
that export lighters to the EU are more likely to import lighter filters during and the transition 
period. Since lighter filters can effectively filter impurities in the gas, and improves combustion, 
the usage of a lighter filter is a signal of quality upgrading. Column 3 and 4 show the galvanizing 
metal shell response to the implementation of the CR act. We also find that lighter exporters which 
export to the EU (treatment group) are more inclined to import galvanizing metal shells relative to 
the control group. Compared to plastic shells, galvanizing metal shells are rust-proof and more 
thermal insulated, and hence, the latter is treated as high quality. Columns 5 and 6 report the 
results for the decision to import electric parts. The results demonstrate that the treated firms are 
more likely to import electric parts rather than flints in response to the CR act implementation. 
Usually, flints are used for producing roller lighters and electric parts are used for electronic 
lighters. The electronic lighters are safer and cleaner than roller lighters in terms of not making 
flint chippings. As such, firms that import electric parts (HS:961390) can be treated as high quality. 
Notice that, in Table 3 the coefficients of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝  are statistically 
insignificant in all columns. The result is in line with the results for export quality response in 
Table 2: in order to upgrade export quality, firms usually improve their imported intermediate in 
the previous year (e.g. see Roberts, et al. 2012, Dai and Yu, 2013), and because firms do not 
continuously upgrade their export quality, we find no evidence that firms continuously upgrade 
their import quality after the transition period. 
All results in Table 3 indicate that firms which export to the EU region after 2007, tend to 
improve the quality of their imported intermediates more than firms export to non-EU countries. 
This implies an improvement of their export quality. Importantly, the treated group not only 
improves their quality to comply with the requirements in the CR act (the safety requirements), 
but also improve their export quality in other dimensions. This implies that technical barriers lead 
exporters to upgrade more than required, which is consistent with the literature. Quality upgrading 
usually associated with huge fixed costs (e.g. Roberters et al., 2012, Maskus et al., 2005). As such, 
after firms incur huge fixed costs, they can upgrade the quality of their products in numerous 
dimensions in a relatively low marginal cost rather than upgrade only one quality dimension to 
comply with the CR act.
16
 This is also the reason why we do detect insignificant dynamic effect 
of the CR act on the firm-level export quality: the treated firms have upgraded their export quality 
in numerous dimensions at one time.  
4.3 The impact of the CR act on firm-level export scale 
We next study the impact of the CR act on Chinese firms’ exports, in terms of export volume 
and value (hypothesis 2). We estimate regression (1), and (2) by changing the dependent variable 
                                                             
16Maskus et al., (2005) demonstrate that quality upgrading increases the variable production cost by 0.06 to 0.13 
percent, but increases the fixed costs increase by 5 percent. 
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to be firm-level log export value and volume. All results are reported in Table 4. 
[Table 4 is to be here] 
Column 1 and column 2 of Table 4 report the estimation results of regression (1). Similar to 
the quality results, the coefficient on the 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 variable is insignificant no matter 
whether we use firm-level export value or volume. These results imply that during the transition 
period, firm-level exports to the EU do not fall. This is consistent with quality response result: 
market structure does not change, and low quality lighters still can be exported to the EU during 
the transition period. As such, firm-level exports in this period are not affected. In contrast, the 
coefficient on 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝  is negative and statistically significant. This 
demonstrates that the exports of Chinese cigarette lighters fall in the EU when the CR act is 
implemented. One possible interpretation is that Chinese exporters increase their export price 
(quality) in the EU after the implementation of the CR act. As such, they have to compete in the 
high quality cigarette lighter market, which is not the comparative advantage of Chinese lighter 
firms, and hence, this reduces the demand for Chinese cigarette lighters.  
Since export scale is unaffected during transition period, we drop the interaction term, 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝, and estimate regression (1) again. Results in column 3 and column 4  
shows that coefficients on our interactive terms are still negative significant, indicating that the 
implementation of CR act led to decline of exports to EU market.  
Results on dynamic impact of CR act on firm-level exports are presented in columns 5 and 6. 
The results demonstrate that not only is the coefficient of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 is negative 
and statistically significant, but so is the coefficient of 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 × 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2008. 
This suggests that the implementation of the CR act reduce the firm-level exports, and it will 
further decrease firm-level exports in the subsequent period, which may imply market switching 
among Chinese exporters. One possible interpretation is that after the implementation of the CR 
act, some foreign firms which cannot profitability export to the EU before the CR act come back 
to compete with Chinese firms, which intensifies the competition in the EU and aggravates the 
export difficulty for cigarette lighter exporters from China. As a result, some Chinese exporters 
who upgrade their product quality need to switch their exports from the EU to other profitable 
countries. 
4.4 The heterogeneous impact of the CR act 
In this section, we examine the heterogeneous impact of the CR act on different firms. We 
first investigate how firms with different types of ownership respond to the CR act, and next 
examine whether the CR act affects single product firms and multi-product firms differently. 
Firms with different ownership significantly differ in their economic behavior (Lu, 2011; Qin, 
2011). For instance, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are larger than their private counterparts, and 
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are more closely connected with the government (Li and Xu, 2015; Berkowitz et al., forthcoming). 
In contrast, foreign-owned and private firms are less affected by the government, and they can 
more flexibly adjust their economic behavior to maximize profits. In addition, relative to SOEs 
and private firms, foreign-owned firms are more likely to use advanced technology, and are often 
highly productive (Tao et al., 2012;  Helpman et al., 2004).
17
 Therefore, firms with different 
ownership may respond to the CR act differently. To investigate possible heterogeneous effects, 
we estimate the benchmark regression for subsamples of firms with different types of ownership. 
The results are reported in Table 5. 
[Table 5 is to be here] 
The results in Table 5 verify our expectation. According to estimated results SOEs and 
privately owned firms tend to increase their product quality, and decrease their export scale in 
response to the implementation of the CR act (although the results are not statistically significant 
for SOEs). Interestingly, the export scale of foreign owned firms tend to increase after the 
implementation of the CR act, and their export quality has no significant change. These results 
might suggest that foreign-owned firms export high quality cigarette lighters even before the 
implementation of CR act, and hence their products comply with the CR act already. When a large 
number of Chinese lighter exporters exit from the EU market after 2007, the foreign owned firms 
face a much less competitive market, and hence they increase their exports to the EU. The 
insignificant impact of the CR act on the SOEs might arise because of their connection with the 
government, and they receive notifications to upgrade their product quality or exit from the EU 
earlier than other firms. All results indicate that the patterns we find are mainly driven by the 
private cigarette lighter exporters.  
We next investigate whether the impact of the CR act is identical among single-product and 
multi-product exporters. In China, multi-product firms account for a non-negligible share in total 
exports. During 2000-2006, more than 70% exporting firms in China are multi-product firms (Tan, 
et al., 2015). Relative to single-product firms, multi-product firms frequently adjust their product 
and export destination mix over time (Bernard et al., 2010). Therefore, the comparison of 
responses between single-product and multi-product firms is of both policy and academic interest. 
We estimate the benchmark regression for single-product and multi-product exporters, respectively, 
and all results are reported in Table 6 below. 
[Table 6 is to be here] 
The results in Table 6 indicate that both single-product and multi-product exporters are 
influenced by the implementation of the CR act, although they are not affected during the 
transition period. The results show that relative to the control group, exports to the EU by the 
                                                             
17 Helpman et al., (2004), for instance, demonstrate that the most productive firms carry out FDI. The 
foreign-owned firms are invested by foreign companies, and hence they are, on average, more productive than the 
domestic Chinese firms (including domestic and private).  
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multi-product firms decline more than exports by the single-product firms. One possible reason is 
that multi-product firms can more flexibly adjust their product mix and destination mix. After the 
CR act, the multi-product firms can introduce new product which are not affected cigarette lighters 
by the CR act (cannibalization effect), or switch the exports of their affected products to non-EU 
countries. As such, the cannibalization effect and market switching both lead exports to the EU 
market decline more for the multi-product firms. 
4. 5 The impact of the CR act on firm exit 
In the above analysis we investigate the impact of the CR act on the firm-level export 
quality, volume and value. Now we turn to study the impact of the CR act on firm-level extensive 
margin (hypothesis 3). We are primarily interested in how firms with different productivity 
respond to the CR act. According to the heterogeneous firm literature, fixed export cost leads only 
more productive firms to export. (e.g. Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Aw et al., 2000; Girm et al., 2004; 
Arnold and Hussinger, 2005; De Loecker, 2007; Greenaway and Kneller, 2007; Hahn and Park, 
2007). The implementation of the CR act potentially requires all exporters to invest a fixed R&D 
cost to improve their product quality. The literature predicts that low productivity firms can not 
afford the fixed cost and will choose to exit from the export market. In order to test this hypothesis, 
we estimate equation (4) and report all results in Table 7. 
[Table 7 is to be here] 
Column 1 of Table 6 reports the results for the full sample (containing all cigarette lighter 
exporters). The result shows that low productivity firms are more likely to exit from EU after the 
implementation of the CR act. Column 2 repeats the same regression but excludes intermediary 
firms, which are identified by the Chinese characters in their name (i.e., “Jinchukou”, “Jingmao”, 
and “Maoyi”). The results still indicate more productive firms are more likely to survive after the 
CR act.  
Column 3 reports the difference in the likelihood of exiting between direct trade and 
intermediary trade firms. The variable Trade intermediaries take a value of 1 if a firm is an 
intermediary trade firm, and is 0 otherwise. The result indicates that after the implementation of 
the CR act, intermediary trade firms are more likely to exit from the EU market. This may because 
that intermediary firms are engaged in trade on behalf of a number of firms which have no export 
license. The firms that export through intermediary firms are normally small and characterized by 
low productivity, and hence they cannot overcome the technical barriers. This makes the 
intermediary firms more likely to exit. 
Column 4 reports the difference in the likelihood of exiting between single-product and 
multi-product firms. The variable Single-product takes value 1 if a firm is a single-product 
exporter, and 0 otherwise. The result implies that single-product exporters are more likely to exit 
from the EU after the CR act. One possible reason is that normally single-product firms are often 
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small, relative to multi-product firms, and they cannot afford the R&D cost to improve product 
quality. As such, single-product firms exhibit a higher turnover rate in the EU market than 
multi-product exporters. This result is consistent with the results in Table 5. Since single-product 
firms are more likely to exit from the EU, the continuing single-product firms are of higher 
productivity. Therefore, their exports are not influenced as much as those of multi-product firms. 
A natural consequence of the less productive firms’ exit from EU is to increase the average 
productivity distribution of continuing exporters. We depict the productivity distributions in 2004 
and 2008 to compare the changes in productivity distribution. The solid curve in Figure 3 is the 
productivity distribution in 2008, while the dashed curve is the productivity distribution in 2004. 
Clearly, the average productivity shifts to the right after the implementation of the CR act. The 
welfare implication is that after the CR act, less productive firms exit from EU, and more 
productive firms’ production share increases. As such resources reallocates to more productive 
firms, and the welfare in affected country increases due to the resource reallocation (e.g. Hsieh 
and Klenow, 2009).  
[Figure 3 is to be here] 
5.  Robustness Check 
As we have shown in Table 1, a considerable share of cigarette lighter firms export to EU and 
non-EU countries simultaneously. This implies that some firms belong to both treatment and 
control groups. It is quite possible that after some firms invest in R&D in order to improve their 
product quality, their export quality increases in both the EU and non-EU countries. If this 
happens, we underestimate the quality increase in the EU. At the same time, firms that export to 
more destinations are often more productive and produce higher quality products (Manova and 
Zhang, 2012). If firms that export to both the EU and non-EU countries produce high quality 
products, we expect their exports in the EU are less affected by the CR act, which leads to a 
underestimate of the impact of the CR act on firm-level exports. To address these concerns, we 
construct alternative treatment and control groups as follows: the treatment group contains firms 
that export cigarette lighters to the EU, and the control group contains firms that export cigarette 
lighters only to non-EU countries.
18
 Using the alternative treatment and control groups, we 
re-estimate the benchmark regression, and the results are reported in Table 8. 
[Table 8 is to be here] 
The results in Table 8 indicate that after re-defining the treatment and control groups, the 
firm-level export quality increases more relative to the benchmark regression (1.21 V.S. 0.99), and 
the firm-level export value and volume decrease more (-0.96 V.S. -0.85; -2.15 V.S. -1.81). This 
implies that no matter how we define the treatment and control groups, our previous results still 
                                                             
18 In this way, we drop all observation that firms export cigarette lighters to both the EU and non-EU countries, 
and also firms that switch their export destinations.  
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hold. 
6.  Conclusion 
TBT is a main NTB tool to strict imports from other countries and protect domestic 
production. With the development of trade liberalization, these technical barriers are frequently 
adopted by different countries, especially developed countries, to adjust their trade balance. While 
a substantial number of research studies the effect of TBTs on trade at the country or product level, 
few studies have documented about their effect on firm-level export behavior.   
Using the CR act as a quasi-natural experiment, this paper investigates the impact of TBTs on 
firm-level export behavior. The results demonstrate that during the transition period, Chinese 
cigarette lighter firms did not upgrade their export quality in the EU, and their exports to the EU 
where unaffected. However, firms which will met the technical barriers started upgrading their 
import materials during the transition period. Further, we find that the firm-level export quality in 
the EU significantly increases relative to that in the non-EU markets after the implementation of 
the CR act. Interestingly, cigarette lighter firms that export to the EU not only adjust their export 
quality to meet requirements by the CR act, but also upgrade their product quality in other 
dimensions. After the implementation of the CR act, less productive exporters start to exit from 
the EU market, and survivors exhibit a significant fall in their exports to the EU. Although the CR 
act does not display any dynamic impact on firm-level export quality, it exhibits a significant 
dynamic impact on the firm-level export scale: e.g., the firm-level exports to the EU will continue 
to fall in the subsequent years after the implementation of the CR act.   
The CR act has heterogeneous impacts on firm-level export behavior. When privately owned 
firms lose their market share after the implementation of the CR act, foreign owned firms benefit 
from this act. In addition, relative to single product firms, the exports of multi-product firms 
decline more in the EU market.  
All of our results imply that although technical barriers are a negative shock to the affected 
countries, it also generates positive effects. Such positive effects are revealed in two dimensions. 
First, TBTs lead affected firms to upgrade their product quality, and the extent of quality 
upgrading extent is greater than that required by TBTs. Second, along with the exit of less 
productive firms, TBTs result in resource reallocation within the affected countries: more 
productive firms choose to upgrade their product quality, and hence occupy a larger market share. 
Although the exit of less productive exporters leads to a welfare loss in the affected countries, the 
resource reallocation brings welfare gains. Without taking the gains into account, we tend to 
overestimate the loss caused by TBTs. 
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Appendix: Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 1a: Flexible estimates of the relationship between CR act and export quality 
 
  
Figure 1b: Flexible estimates of the relationship 
between CR act and export value  
 
Figure 1c: Flexible estimates of the relationship 
between CR act and export volume  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a: Plastic shelled lighters and galvanized 
metal shelled lighters 
 
Figure 2b: Roller lighters and electric lighters 
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Figure 3  Firm-level productivity distribution before and after the CR act 
 
Table 1  Comparison before and After CR Act 
 
Before CR Act  
EU Market 
(1) 
Before CR Act  
non-EU Market 
(2) 
(1)/(2) 
After CR Act  
EU Market 
(3) 
After CR Act 
non-EU 
Market    
(4) 
(3)/(4) 
Export Share(Value) 0.42 0.95 44.21% 0.28 0.95 29.47% 
Export Share(Volumn) 0.43 0.95 45.26% 0.32 0.95 33.68% 
Unit price 1.61 1.29 1.25 7.43 3.47 2.14 
Note: Before CR Act refers to 2004~2006; After CR Act refers to 2007~2008; Export share is the weighted 
average for firm with weight equaling to firm's export in the EU/non-EU market; Unit price is simple average for 
each firm.  
 
Table 2  The impact of the CR act on firm-level export quality in EU 
 
    (1)     (2)    (3)    (4)        (5) (6) 
Transition×Group 0.042 -0.128 -0.011 0.067 
 
 
 
(0.19) (-0.54) (-0.06) (0.83) 
 
 
Implementation×Group 1.501
***
 0.990
***
 0.958
***
 0.356
**
 1.035
***
 0.769
***
 
 
(7.69) (4.66) (5.62) (3.80) (5.29) (3.02) 
Implementation×Group×year2008 
     
0.485
 
      
(1.63) 
ER -0.704
*** 
-0.328
* 
-0.003 -0.352
*** 
-0.320
* 
-0.277 
 
(-4.58) (-1.90) (-0.12) (-5.87) (-1.85) (-1.59) 
Constant -3.356
***
 -3.686
***
 -4.073
***
 1.020
***
 -3.682
***
 -3.689
***
 
 
(-7.62) (-8.28) (-10.68) (5.73) (-8.28) (-3.30) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 4113 4113 4113 4113 4113 4113 
R
2
 0.36 0.36 0.31 0.36 0.36 0.36 
Note：The t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level 
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Table 3                   The impact of the CR act on firm-level import quality 
 Filter Galvanizing metal Shell Electric Parts 
 OLS  Logit OLS Logit OLS Logit 
Transition×Group 0.080
**
 
(2.27) 
0.488
** 
(2.30) 
0.068
** 
(2.00) 
0.419
* 
(1.91) 
0.079
** 
(2.12) 
0.521
** 
(2.10) 
Implementation×Group 0.025 
(0.70) 
0.191 
(0.76) 
0.013 
(0.37) 
-0.043 
(-0.16) 
0.024 
(0.60) 
0.226 
(0.88) 
Cons 0.099
*** 
(6.31) 
 0.091
*** 
(6.03) 
 0.110
*** 
(6.24) 
 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1,518 1,518 1,518 1,518 1,518 1,518 
R
2
 0.53 0.09 0.47 0.09 0.54 0.08 
Note：The t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level 
 
 
 
 
Table 4The impact of the CR act on firm-level exports in EU 
Dep Var 
Export 
Value 
Export 
Volume 
Export 
Value 
Export 
Volume 
Export 
Value 
Export 
Volume 
Transition×Group 0.159 0.321 
  
  
 
(0.65) (0.79) 
  
  
Implementation×Group -0.854
*** 
-1.807
*** 
-0.909
*** 
-1.919
*** -0.511
** 
-1.265
*** 
 
(-3.95) (-5.04) (-4.58) (-5.83) (-1.97) (-2.96) 
Implementation×Group×year2008   
  
-0.720
** 
-1.190
** 
 
  
  
(-2.40) (-2.39) 
ER -0.052 0.101 -0.063 0.079 -0.128 -0.025 
 
(-0.30) (0.35) （-0.36） (0.27) （-0.73） (-0.08) 
Cons 10.741
***
 14.432
*** 
10.736
***
 14.423
***
 10.746
*** 
14.439
***
 
 
(23.81) （19.34） (23.80) (19.33) (23.84) (19.37) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 4113 4113 4113 4113 4113 4113 
R
2
 0.14 0.27 0.14 0.27 0.14 0.27 
Note：The t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level 
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Table 5:The impact of the CR act on different ownership firms 
Sample SOE Private  Foreign Owned 
Dep Var Price 
Export 
Value 
Export 
Volume 
Price 
Export 
Value 
Export 
Volume 
Price 
Export 
Value 
Export 
Volume 
Transition -0.205 0.430 0.590 0.119 -0.033 -0.034 -0.642 0.939* 1.504 
×Group (-0.35) (0.75) (0.60) (0.40 ) (-0.11) (-0.07) (-1.13) (1.68) (1.63) 
Implementation 0.353 -0.609 -1.072 1.579*** -1.775*** -3.314*** -0.523 1.138** 1.596* 
×Group (0. 69) (-1.23) (-1.25) (4.99) (-5.63) (-6.28) (-0.99) (2.20) (1.87) 
ER -0.326 -0.099 -0.061 -0.696** 0.533 1.208** -0.441 -0.504 -0.292 
 
(-0.35) (-0.22) (-0.08) (-2.12) (1.63) (2.20) (-1.22) (-1.44) (-0.51) 
Cons -3.747*** 10.476*** 14.231*** -3.621*** 10.509*** 14.122*** -3.039 10.684*** 13.780*** 
 
(-2.65) (7.72) (6.05) (-8.24) (24.07) (19.31) (-1.41) (4.47) (4.02) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 774 774 774 1903 1903 1903 917 917 917 
R2 0.47 0.29 0.41 0.39 0.24 0.35 0.33 0.16 0.21 
Note：The t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: The impact of the CR act on single-product and multi-product firms 
Sample Single-product firms Multi-product firms 
Dep Var Price 
Export 
Value 
Export Volume Price 
Export 
Value 
Export Volume 
Transition -0.018 0.327 0.406 -0.161 -0.026 0.127 
×Group (-0.06) (1.08) (0.82) (-0.46) (-0.07) (0.21) 
Implementation 0.699
**
 -0.478
* 
-1.016
** 
0.883
*** 
-0.829
*** 
-1.742
*** 
×Group (2.39) (-1.71) (-2.19) (3.00) (-2.68) (-3.51) 
ER -0.162 -0.165 -0.398 -0.609
** 
0.078 0.715
* 
 
(-0.73) (-0.79) (-1.13) (-2.40) (0.29) (1.68) 
Cons -3.784 10.847
***
 14.698
***
 -3.635
*** 
10.753
***
 14.370
***
 
 
(-7.67) (23.02) (18.89) (-4.51) (12.75) (10.62) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 2053 2053 2053 2060 2060 2060 
R
2 
0.33 0.15 0.22 0.41 0.18 0.33 
Note：The t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level 
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Table 7                  The impact of the CR act on firm-level exit rate in EU 
 
        (1)              （2） (3) (4) 
productivity -0.149
*** -0.131
** 
-0.165
*** -0.255
*** 
 
(-3.57) （-2.26） (-3.84) (-5.02) 
Trade Intermediaries 
 
 
0.571
***  
  
 (3.28)  
Single-product    
  1.249
*** 
  
  （5.81） 
Cons 3.352
*** 2.751
*** 
3.290
***
 4.201
*** 
 
(4.98) （3.00） (4.77) （5.41） 
Obs 333 125 333 333 
Pseudo R
2
 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.17 
Note：The t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level 
 
Table 8                           Robustness Check 
Dep Var Export Quality Export Value Export Volume 
Transition×Group -0.004 1.745 0.207 
 
(-0.01) (0.60) (0.44) 
Implementation×Group 1.207
*** 
-0.956
*** 
-2.153
*** 
 
(4.89) (-3.69) (-5.14) 
ER -0.519
** -0.008 0.251 
 
(-2.12) (-0.03) （0.61） 
Cons -3.726
***
 11.180
*** 
14.918
***
 
 
(-3.99) （19.34） (9.47) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Destination FE Yes Yes Yes 
Obs 1901 1901 1901 
R
2
 0.34 0.13 0.22 
Note：The t-statistics are in the parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% and 10% significant level 
 
 
 
Reference: 
 
Ahn ,J., Khandelwal ,A., and Wei, S.J., 2011, “The role of intermediaries in facilitating trade”, 
Journal of International Economics, 84, 73-85. 
Baldwin, R., 2001, “Regulatory protectionism, developing nations and a two-tier world trade 
system”, CEPR Discussion Paper, No.257. 
Baldwin, R., and Harrigan, J., 2011, “Zeros, quality, and space: trade theory and trade evidence”, 
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3(2), 60-88. 
Bao, X.H., and Qiu, L.D.,2012,“How do technical barriers to trade influence trade?”, Review of 
International Economics, 20(4), 691-706. 
Berkowitz, D., Ma, H., and Shuichiro, N., “Recasting the iron bowl: The evolution of China's state 
owned enterprises”, Review of Economics and Statistics, forthcoming. 
Bernard, A. B., Redding, S., and Schott, P.K., 2006, “Multi product Firms and the dynamics of 
product mix”, NBER Working Paper, No.12293. 
Berry, T., 1994, “Estimating discrete-Choice models of product differentiation”, The RAND 
23 
 
Journal of Economics, 25(2), 242-262. 
Bown.C.P., 2011,“Taking stock of antidumping, safeguards and countervailing duties”, World 
Economy, 34,1955-1998. 
Chaney, T., 2008, “Distorted Gravity: The intensive and extensive margins of international trade”, 
American Economic Review, 98(4), 1707–1721.  
Chen, M.X., Otsuki, T., and Wilson, J.S., 2008, “Standards and export decisions: Firm-level 
evidence from developing countries”, Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 
17(4), 501-523. 
Chevassus-Lozza, E., Majkovic, D., Persillet, V.,2005, “Technical barriers to trade in the EU”,11th 
EAAE congress, 24-27 August, Copenhagen, Denmark. 
Czubala, W., Stepherd, B., and Wilson, J.S., 2009, “Help or hindrance? The impact of harmonized 
standards on African exports”, Journal of African Economies, 18(5), 711-744. 
Dixit, A., 1989a, “Entry and exit decisions under uncertainty”, Journal of Political Economy, 
97(3), 620-638. 
Dixit, A., 1989b, “Hysteresis, import penetration, and exchange rate pass-through”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 104(2), 205-228. 
Eckel, C., Neary, P., 2010. Multi-product firms and flexible manufacturing in the global economy. 
Review of Economic Studies, 77, 188-217.  
Fischer, R., and Serra, P., 2000, “Standards and protection”, Journal of International Economics, 
52(2), 337-400. 
Ganslandt, M., and Markusen, J.R., 2001, “Standards and related regulations in international trade: 
A modeling approach”, NBER Working Paper, No.8346. 
Garvin, D. A.1987,“Competing on the eight dimensions of quality”, Harvard Business Review, 
65(6). 
Han, J., Liu, R.J., and Zhang, J.S., 2012, “Globalization and wage inequality: Evidence from 
urban China”, Journal of International Economics, 87, 288-297. 
Hallak, J., 2006, “Product quality and direction of trade”, Journal of International Economics, 
68(1), 238-265. 
Hummels, D. and Skiba, A.,2004, “Shipping the good apples out? An empirical confirmation of 
the alchian-allen conjecture”, Journal of Political Economics, 112(6), 1384-1402. 
Khandlwal, A.K., Schott, P.K. and Wei, S.J.,  2013, “Trade liberalization and embedded 
institutional reform: Evidence from Chinese exporters”, American Economic Review, 
103(6), 2169-2195.    
Krugman, P., Exchange rate instability, MIT Press, Cambridge MA, 1989. 
Li, S.S. and Xu, N.X., 2015, “The influences of WTO accession on China's state-owned 
enterprises”, Open Journal of Business and Management, 3, 192-198. 
Lu, Y. , 2011, “Political connections and trade expansion: Evidence from Chinese private firm”, 
Economics of Transition, 19 (2), 231–254. 
Lu,Y., Tao, Z.G., and Zhang,Y., 2013, “How do exporters respond to antidumping 
investigations? ”, Journal of International Economics, 91(2), 290-300. 
24 
 
Ludema, R., and Yu, Z.2016, “Tariff pass-through, firm heterogeneity and product quality”, 
Journal of International Economics, 103, 234-249.  
Manova, K., and Zhang, Z., 2012, “Export prices across firms and destinations”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 127(1), 379-436. 
Maskus, K.E., Otsuki, T., and Wilson, J.S.,2005, “The cost of compliance with product standards 
for firms in developing countries: An econometric study”, The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper Series, No.3590 
Melitz, M.J., 2003, “The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry 
productivity”, Econometrica,71 (6), 1695-1725. 
Portugal-Perez, A., Reyes, J.D., and Wilson, J.S., 2009, “Beyond the information technology 
agreement: harmonization of standards and trade in electronics”, The World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper, No.4916.  
Prusa, T., 2001, “On the spread and impact of antidumping”, Canadian Journal of Economics, 34, 
591-611. 
Rodrik, D., 2006, “What is so special about China's export”, NBER Working Paper, No.11947. 
Qin, B. , 2011, “Political connection and government patronage: Evidence from Chinese 
manufacturing firms”, Working Paper. 
Schott, P., 2004, “Across-product versus within-product specialization in international trade”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(2), 647-678. 
Wang, Z., and Wei, S.J., “What accounts for the rising sophistication of China's exports”, 
R.Feenstra and Wei, S.J. eds., China's Growing Role in World Trade. Cambridge, MA, 2010. 
Xu, B., and Lu, J.Y., 2009, “Foreign direct investment, processing trade and sophistication of 
China's export”, China Economic Review, 20(3), 425-439. 
Zanardi, M., 2006,“Antidumping: a problem in international trade”, European Journal of Political 
Economy, 22(3), 591-617. 
 
 
 
